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Abstract 
This article looks at lessons from the 2007/2008 global financial crises for African low-income 
countries' financial sectors and suggests research questions which need to be investigated. It 
examines lessons from recent empirical literature both for the scale and structure of the financial 
sector as well as its regulation. Excessive—and too rapid growth—of the financial sector is 
warned against as it can cause very costly financial crises and does not necessarily contribute to 
financing the real economy. The paper recommends that where market failures exist, 
government interventions through public institutions or indirect mechanisms may be desirable. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Finance provides a particularly challenging and important field for policy design and 
policy-relevant research, especially if placed in the context of those countries’ needs for 
development. The policy challenges and research needs are very large, due partly to a major 
rethinking of the role, scale and structure of a desirable financial sector, as well as its regulation, 
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in light of the major financial crisis that started in 2007/8. There is an urgent need to understand 
the implications of this policy and analytical rethinking for Sub-Saharan African (SSA), 
especially low income countries’ (LICs) financial sectors, especially regarding its impact on their 
economic growth.  
The financial sectors of African LICs are still at an early stage of development, so lessons 
from the crisis could inform their financial sector development strategies. Moreover, their 
financial sectors, while generally still shallow, are experiencing fairly rapid growth. Combined 
with African countries’ existing vulnerabilities, such as limited regulatory capacity, this might 
pose risks to financial system stability. Despite the infrequent appearance of systemic banking 
crisis on the African continent over the past decade (see below), fast credit growth in many 
economies—even if at comparatively low levels—calls for caution, signaling the need for strong, 
as well as countercyclical, regulation of African financial systems. For policymakers and 
researchers this poses the challenge of applying the lessons from the crisis in developed and 
previously in emerging countries to African LICs, while paying careful attention to the specific 
features of African financial systems.  
There are also more traditional policy challenges and research gaps on financial sectors 
in LICs, and their links to inclusive growth. To support growth, there are a range of functions 
that the financial sector must meet in African LICs, such as helping to mobilize sufficient 
savings; intermediating savings at low cost and long maturities to investors and consumers; 
ensuring that savings are channeled to the most efficient investment opportunities; and helping 
companies and individuals manage risk. There are also large deficiencies in these areas 
originating from specific market failures and/or gaps. For example, there is a lack of sustainable 
lending at relatively low spreads, including with long maturities to small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs), which is particularly constraining for growth in LICs. 
This paper presents two key areas for a policy, as well as corresponding research agenda 
on finance and growth in Sub Saharan Africa building partly on lessons from the Global 
Financial Crisis: 1) the desirable size and structure of the financial sector and 2) new challenges 
for financial regulation. The discussions in these two areas is important to advance 
understanding on the links between the financial sector and inclusive as well as sustainable 
growth.   
2. FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH  
Central bankers and financial regulators in African LICs have always faced major 
conceptual and institutional challenges in striking the right balance in their policy design to 
achieve the triple aims of financial stability, growth and equity.  
 These challenges acquired a new dimension in the light of numerous financial crises, 
initially in the developing world, but recently in developed countries. The latter led to a major 
re-evaluation of the role of the financial sector, its interactions with the real economy and the 
need for major reform of its regulation, especially in developed and emerging economies (see 
for example, Griffith-Jones, Ocampo and Stiglitz, 2010, as well as IMF, 2011 and 2012, as well as 
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Haldane and Madouros, 2012 on the need to simplify regulation); the latter resonates very well 
with LICs. Before examining the implications of this analysis for SSA countries, we will look 
first at how the Global Financial crisis affected SSA countries. 
 Interestingly, although the Global Financial Crisis originated in and strongly hit 
developed economies, its cost to developing SSA (in contrast to all LICs on average) in terms of 
foregone growth and investment as well as falling tax revenue with increasing budget deficits is 
quite substantial. Developing SSA3 suffered a GDP growth slowdown to 4.0 percent in the 
aftermath of the crisis (2008-2010) in comparison to average growth rates of 4.7 percent between 
2000 and 2007. This equals a loss in GDP growth of 0.7 percentage points (see table 1). SSA 
growth was much more affected by the recent slowdown in economic activity around the 
world—mainly driven by recession and stagnation in developed economies—than that of all 
low income countries on average, which have managed to grow by 0.4 percent more in the same 
period (2008-2010, compared to 2000-2007). Similarly, the crisis impact on tax revenue is 
potentially larger in SSA than in low income economies on average. While low income countries 
did not see a reduction in tax revenue in the aftermath of the crisis, taxes collected in SSA fell by 
1.7 percent of GDP in comparison to pre-crisis levels. Concurrently, budget positions in SSA 
countries worsened by 1 percent of GDP on average.  
Table 1: The Impact of the global financial crisis on high, middle and low income countries 
Region/Country Decline in 
GDP 
growth 
Decline in 
investment 
(% of GDP) 
Decline in 
tax revenue 
(% of GDP) 
Rise in 
budget 
deficit (% 
of GDP) 
High income 
countries 
-2.7 -2.2 -1.2 -4.2 
Middle income 
countries 
-.08 3.2 0.8 n/a 
Low income 
countries 
0.4 3.3 0.8 n/a 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
(developing) 
-0.7 2.5 -1.7 -1.0 
Note: All decline figures are calculated a difference between the 2000-07 average 
and the 2008-10 average. Developing Sub-Saharan Africa refers to all Sub-Saharan 
countries with the exception of Equatorial Guinea, which is classified as high 
income 
Source: World DataBank, World Bank, 2013. 
Furthermore, the question can be raised whether SSA growth in investment rates would 
                                                             
3 Developing SSA refers to all SAA countries with the exception of Equatorial Guinea, which is classified as high 
income country by the World Bank. All SSA figures in the document exclude Equatorial Guinea since the focus is on 
developing economies.  
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not have been faster in the absence of the Global Financial Crisis. Figure 1 illustrates this point. 
Gross capital formation (investment), as share of GDP, peaked at 22 percent in 2008 falling by 
almost 1.5 percentage points in the following year. The 2008 level has not been recovered as of 
2011, the latest year for which data are available.  
Figure 1. Impact of the global financial crisis on gross capital formation. 
 
Source: World DataBank, World Bank, 2013. 
It is interesting that the number of banking crises on the African continent has overall 
been remarkably low over the past decade (2000-2009), potentially indicating increased 
resilience of African financial systems particularly in comparison to the 1990s (see figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Systemic banking crises in Africa, 1980-2009 
 
Source: Laeven and Valencia, 2008. 
This argument is in line with the observation that the dissemination of the financial crisis 
from strongly affected advanced economies to African low income countries has mainly 
happened through the trade channel, falling commodity prices as well as shrinking remittances 
and official development assistance budgets. 
In this context the Nigerian banking crisis—discussed below—is seen by some as a 
‘sporadic outlier’ (Beck et al. 2011, p. 3). There is nevertheless the danger that lack of recent 
crises can lead to policymakers’ and regulators’ complacency (as well as that by the financial 
actors), which precisely could increase the risk of future crises. This phenomenon, known in the 
literature as ‚disaster myopia‛, has in the past contributed to increased risk of crises in other 
regions. 
There has been far relatively little research and policy analysis on the implications of the 
Global Financial Crisis for African countries and LICs more generally, with some valuable 
exceptions (see for example, Kasekende et al 2011, and Murinde et al, 2012 for good analysis of 
regulatory issues in LICs). As African financial sectors are growing quite quickly, they may be 
more vulnerable to threats to their financial stability. The value added of policy analysis and 
research on finance and development that explores the right lessons to learn from the Global 
Crisis—and previous ones in emerging economies—for African LICs, is thus likely to be high. 
This research might help answer the question of how the need to ensure financial stability 
interacts with the need of a financial system in LICs that assures enough access to sustainable 
finance for the different sectors of the economy, including long-term finance to fund structural 
change, as well as different segments, such as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and 
infrastructure.  
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3. AREAS OF ANALYSIS 
There are two areas of enquiry for understanding the links between the financial sector 
and inclusive, as well as sustainable, growth: 1) what is the desirable size and structure of the 
financial sector in LICs? and 2) what are the regulatory challenges to maximize the likelihood of 
achieving financial stability, whilst safeguarding inclusive and more sustainable growth? 
Political economy might be a fruitful lens through which to perform such analysis because it 
sheds light on the political determinants of financial policy. 
3.1 SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
At a broad level, what is the desirable (‚optimal‛) size and structure of the financial 
sector in African countries, to maximize its ability to support the real economy? What are the 
desirable paths of development of the financial sector in Africa to help it maximize its 
contribution to growth, considering features of African countries and lessons from recent crises? 
The traditional positive link between deeper as well as larger financial sector and long-
term growth, that started in the literature with Bagehot and Schumpeter, but then was reflected 
in quite a large part of the empirical literature, such as Levine (2005), is being increasingly 
challenged. Authors like Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2000) had already early on suggested that 
financial depth (measured by private credit to GDP ratio) reduces volatility of output up to a 
point, but beyond that, actually increases output volatility. More recently, a number of papers 
are showing inverse relation between size of financial sector and growth, especially beyond a 
certain level of financial development, which is estimated at around 80-100 percent of private 
credit to GDP. Thus, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) economists (Cecchetti and K. 
Kharroubi, 2012) based on empirical work reach the following conclusions, which challenges 
much of earlier writing:  
‚First, with finance you can have too much of a good thing. That is, at low levels, 
a larger financial system goes hand in hand with higher productivity growth. 
But there comes a point, where more banking and more credit lower growth. 
Secondly, looking at the impact of growth in the financial system—measured in 
employment or value added—on real growth, they find clear evidence that faster 
growth in finance is bad for aggregate real growth. This implies financial booms 
are bad for trend growth. Hence, macro prudential or counter-cyclical 
regulation, discussed below, is important.‛  
Finally, in their examination of industry-level data, they find that industries competing for 
resources with finance are particularly damaged by financial booms. Specifically, 
manufacturing sectors that are R&D-intensive suffer disproportionate reductions in 
productivity growth when finance increases. 
Similarly, an IMF Discussion Paper (IMF, 2012a) suggests empirical explanations for the 
fact that large financial sectors may have negative effects on economic growth. It gives two 
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possible reasons. The first has to do with increased probability of large economic crashes 
(Minsky, 1974, Kindleberger, 1978 and Rajan, 2005) and the second relates to potential 
misallocation of resources, even in good times (Tobin, 1984). De la Torre et al, 2011, point out 
that "Too much finance" may be consistent with positive but decreasing returns of financial 
depth which, at some point, become smaller than the cost of instability. It is interesting that the 
IMF Discussion paper, (op cit.) results are robust to restricting the analysis to tranquil periods. 
This suggests that volatility and banking crises are only part of the story. The explanation for 
the "Too Much Finance" result is not only due to financial crises and volatility, but also 
misallocation of resources. 
It is also plausible that the relationship between financial depth and economic growth 
depends, at least in part, on whether lending is used to finance investment in productive assets 
or to feed speculative bubbles. Not only where credit serves to feed speculative bubbles—where 
excessive increases can actually be negative for growth—but also where it is used for 
consumption purposes as opposed to productive investment, the effect of financial depth on 
economic growth seems limited. Using data for 45 countries for the period 1994-2005, Beck et al. 
(2012), and Beck et al., (2011) show that enterprise credit is positively associated with economic 
growth but that there is no correlation between growth and household credit. Given that the 
share of bank lending to households increases with economic and financial development and 
household credit is often used for consumption purposes whereas enterprise credit is used for 
productive investment, the allocation of resources goes some way towards explaining the non-
linear finance-growth relationship. In African countries, only a small share of bank lending goes 
to households. However, as financial sectors and economies grow, this will change, as has been 
the case in South Africa.  
Rapidly growing credit to households—even though desirable when strengthening 
reasonable levels of domestic demand and financial inclusion, in a sustainable way—might, 
however, cause financial instability if not regulated prudently. This is especially the case if 
lending is excessively channeled into the construction sector, creating a housing bubble. The 
two most advanced African economies, South Africa and Mauritius—both upper middle 
income countries—have recently experienced or are currently experiencing a construction 
boom. Both economies possess relatively deep financial markets with strong private domestic 
lending including significant consumption credit extension. Figure 3 shows that private credit 
in high income economies was around 100 percent of GDP on average in 2010 while it 
accounted for 70-80 percent of GDP in Mauritius and South Africa. 
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Figure 3. Private credit extension in African middle income countries compared to high income countries, 
1990-2000 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World DataBank, World Bank, 2013. 
In international comparison, South Africa was the country in Africa which experiences 
the strongest house real price gains between 2004 and 2007, by far exceeding even the price 
growth in the booming residential property markets of the US and the UK (see figure 4). In 
South Africa the ratio of household to business credit is approximately 1:1. The large majority of 
household borrowing takes on the form of mortgage finance. During the early 2000s this led to 
an unprecedented housing boom in South Africa fed by growth in housing loans of over 500 
percent in real terms between 2000 and 2010 (see figure 5). This was largely absorbed by upper 
income South African households accounting for three quarters of total household credit 
created (DTI, 2010). In an attempt to reduce inflation, asset price increases and potential macro-
economic over-heating, the South African Reserve Bank gradually initiated monetary tightening 
in June 2006, accelerating the rise in interest rates the following year. 
The subsequent economic slowdown in South Africa was to a large extent based on 
domestically accumulating economic and financial imbalances while the Global Financial Crisis 
merely intensified the recession of 2008/09. The fact that credit and consumption-led growth 
was unsustainable in South Africa was illustrated in over 1 million jobs shed in 2008/09, largely 
in low-skilled consumption-driven sectors. A positive aspect was that there was no financial 
crisis, perhaps because of the positive policy response from the economic authorities; however, 
as mortgage credit picks up, and especially if it does at a very fast pace, care has to be taken to 
regulate this. The South African experience reiterates that private sector credit expansion at 
very high levels might lead to output volatility and adverse growth effects (see Easterly, Islam 
and Stiglitz, op cit, and Cecchetti and K. Kharroubi, op cit). In order to prevent future crisis and 
foster economic development a re-orientation towards more business credit, particularly for 
productive investment, might be needed. 
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Figure 5. South African private sector credit extension by purpose, 1990-2012 
 
Source: SARB, 2013. 
  In Mauritius almost one third of private sector credit flows to households, equaling 20 
percent of GDP by late 2012. The majority of household borrowing is mortgage finance (60 
percent of total household credit) with the rest used to fund consumption (40 percent). Given 
sustained demand for residential property housing credit has been growing close to 20 percent 
annually on average over the past 5 years (Bank of Mauritius, 2012). Simultaneously, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) flows into the country concentrate on real estate activities with the bulk 
in tourist resorts, real estate and invest hotels schemes. The construction industry accounted for 
approximately half of FDI inflows in recent years (2008-2012). Mauritius’s construction boom 
should be monitored with caution, which has also been pointed out by the IMF Article IV 
Mission Consultation. Financial vulnerabilities appear to be accumulating in the industry with 
potential adverse impact on balance sheets of domestic commercial banks. Even though non-
performing loans as share of total credit are at reasonably low levels, they have increased from 
2.1 percent to 3.1 percent between 2010 and 2012. Furthermore, non-performing loans in the 
construction industry (excluding housing loans) as share of sectorial credit are more than twice 
as high, rising from around 5 percent in 2010 to 8 percent last year. This development is 
worrying and calls for counter-cyclical regulation especially since year-on-year growth in 
construction credit has shot up sharply during 2012, exceeding 35 percent by September. This is 
almost three times above the long-term average (see figure 6). 
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Figure 6. Construction sector credit in Mauritius 
 
Source: Bank of Mauritius, 2012. 
 
 Limited data availability makes it difficult to measure to what extent consumption credit 
is on the rise in other African economies. This would seem to make the case for more 
disaggregated credit data, as well as monitoring by regulators as well as policymakers, more 
urgent.  
One of the few low income SSA countries providing disaggregated domestic lending 
data is Mozambique (Banco de Moçambique, 2013). Private sector credit has increased 
significantly between 2000 and 2010 in the Southern African country from 15 percent to 23 
percent of GDP (see table 2 below). During this period consumer borrowing almost tripled as 
share of total credit while it grew almost eightfold between 2001 and 2012 in real terms (see 
figure 7). Mozambique has had a strong growth performance implying a robust medium-term 
economic outlook despite stagnant poverty reduction and the need for more inclusive growth 
(IMF, 2012).  
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Figure 7. Mozambican consumer credit in real terms and as share of total private sector credit, 2001-
2012 
 
Source: Banco de Moçambique, 2013 
Nevertheless, falling consumer price inflation has been accompanied by potential price 
pressures present in urban housing markets, which are difficult to assess due to lack of house 
price data for Mozambique. Significant housing rent increases (20-25 percent per year) have 
been reported for upmarket and expatriate areas of Maputo (Emerging Markets Consultants, 
2012) while central areas in Mozambican towns and cities (so-called ‘cement cities’) have been 
observed to experience property price growth of 100 percent annually (CAHF, 2012). 
 More broadly, as we began to discuss above, of relevance for growth is thus the link 
between the structure of the financial sector and growth. The IMF in its Global Financial 
Stability Report (IMF, 2012b) has interesting further empirical analysis of the relationship 
between the structure of the financial sector and economic growth, as well as the volatility of 
this growth and financial stress. This is a fairly under-studied area, and one which has hardly 
been applied to LICs. The preliminary empirical results of the IMF report suggest that cross-
border connections through foreign banks may during crises be associated with instability, 
though their role may be more beneficial in normal times. The empirical evidence also seems to 
show that ‚a domestic financial system that is dominated by some types of non-traditional bank 
intermediation has in some cases been associated with adverse economic outcomes, especially 
during financial crises.‛  
Crucial in the context of policymaking and research on finance in Africa is the extent to 
which the findings on the relationship between the structure and size of the financial sector and 
growth in more developed economies are relevant for and apply to African LICs because their 
financial systems are markedly different. In particular, these countries’ banking systems are 
small in absolute and relative size, many of them reaching the size of mid-sized banks in high-
income countries. Beck et al. (2011), op cit report for instance, that if measured in relative size 
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based on the claims on the private domestic nonfinancial sector to GDP (private credit), the 
median for African countries as a whole (i.e. including North African countries) was 19 percent 
in 2009, while it was 49 percent for non-African developing countries. African financial sectors 
also show levels of financial intermediation and access to financial services has remained 
limited for large segments like SMEs, the agricultural sector or poor households. Many of those 
use informal financial services. In addition, African financial systems are mainly bank-based 
with non-bank segments showing an even lower level of development.  
Given the importance of SMEs in creating employment, the lack of financial 
infrastructure supporting their activity in African financial systems is a major drawback for 
development. International financial indicators show that African businesses in general are 
disadvantaged through less access to finance than competitors in other regions. Concurrently, 
SMEs enjoy a particularly poor access to sources of finance, leaving them with internal cash 
flow as main source for investment finance. As consequence, enabling African SMEs to better 
access financing sources has the potential to strengthen and accelerate growth if done on 
sustainable grounds under adequate regulation.  
The obstacles African SMEs experience in their domestic financial systems are mainly 
concentrated around the insufficient support by financial and banking institutions, lacking 
development of equity and bond markets and alternative sources of finance. Therefore, recent 
developments of deepening African financial markets might help SME growth if successfully 
and sustainably channeled into this segment. International indicators such as the capital access 
index and domestic analysis via enterprise surveys, by company size, support this view as 
argued below.  
 
Figure 8. Milken Institute Capital Access Fund Index, 2009. 
 
Source: Milken Institute, 2010. 
 
A measure that can be used to understand the overall ability of businesses and 
entrepreneurs to access domestic and foreign capital is the Milken Institute’s capital access 
index, CAI (Barth et al., 2010) which is a ranking tool of the relative strength and performance of 
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capital markets around the world4. African economies perform most poorly, with a score of 3.07 
on a scale of 0 to 10, on business access to capital (see figure 8). Furthermore, of the 61 countries 
that form the bottom half of the ranking, 30 are African countries, while 17 of the 20 countries 
with the lowest scores are African low income economies (see table 2).  
Table 2: Bottom 20 CAI scores and country rankings 
Country Score 
Mozambique 2.74 
Cameroon 2.67 
Rwanda 2.64 
Burkina Faso 2.63 
Syria 2.59 
Benin 2.58 
Sierra Leone 2.56 
Ethiopia 2.44 
Laos 2.37 
Mali 2.37 
Central Africa Republic 2.32 
Togo 2.31 
Guinea 2.19 
Mauritania 2.18 
Republic of Congo 2.17 
Madagascar 2.13 
Chad 2.06 
Niger 2.03 
Haiti 1.95 
Burundi 1.87 
Source: Milken Institute, 2010. 
The graphs below illustrates the difficulties that African businesses and entrepreneurs 
have in accessing finance (see figure 10), in comparison to the average for all countries in more 
detail (see figure 9). African economies struggle to establish internationally competitive 
financial and banking institutions, to support equity and bond market development as well as 
to develop alternative sources of finance. All these, and particularly alternative sources of 
finance, could serve as crucial sources of finance for SMEs. 
 
                                                             
4 This is achieved by assessing the macroeconomic environment, institutional environment, financial and banking 
institutions, equity market development, bond market development, alternative sources of capital, international 
funding in the relevant countries. The CAI is compiled by the Milken Institute and ranks 122 nations on six 
continents. The latest CAI, referred to in this document, has been provided by the Milken Institute for 2009. 
Working paper prepared for JICA/IPD Africa Task Force Meeting 
Yokohama, Japan, June 2-3, 2013 
14 
Figure 9. CAI components for Africa compared to the average. 
 
Source: World Bank, 2013. 
There is a gap of 4.28 (ranked out of 10) in the score between the top (South Africa) and the 
worst performing African country (Burundi) in the CAI ranking. This could indicate large 
discrepancy in financial sector development on the African continent.  
Figure 10: Regional percent of firms by firm size with a bank loan/line of credit  
 
Source: World Bank, 2013.  
Note: Years vary for different regions, ranging from between 2006—2012. 
Assessing the ability of firms to access finance more deeply, the percentage of small, 
medium and large firms that have a bank loan or a credit line can serve as a measure (see 
figures 10 and 11). Sub-Saharan African small and medium sized firms have poor access to 
finance (only 17 percent of them, as opposed to 40 percent in Latin America, and 32 percent in 
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East Asia) when compared to other developing regions, performing only better than Middle 
East and North Africa region. This analysis of access to credit by firm size is taken further below 
for some Sub-Saharan African countries on two levels:  
1) By looking at the firms of different sizes and the implications on the ability of the firm to 
have a bank loan or a credit line; 
2) By assessing whether the performance based on the size of the firm is different if the 
CAI score for the African country was in the bottom half or the top half. 
In some cases where the CAI score is high small businesses have nevertheless poorer 
access to finance (measured as share of total firms with access to bank loan/line of credit) than 
countries that scored in the bottom of the CAI rankings. This is true, for example, for South 
Africa as compared to Rwanda, Burundi and Benin (see figure 11). 
Figure 11. Access to bank loans and/or lines of credit by some SSA countries’ firms. 
 
Source: World Bank, 2013. 
Note: Years vary for different countries, ranging from between 2006—2011. 
 
In general, between 60 percent and 70 percent of SMEs in Sub-Saharan Africa need 
loans, however only 17 percent of small and 31 percent of medium-sized firms actually have 
access to finance. As a consequence, firms in Sub-Saharan Africa have to finance a high 
proportion of investment through internally generated cash flows (82 percent among small Sub-
Saharan African firms, see figure 12). This reflects the CAI finding that African countries lack 
developed equity and bond markets, alternative sources of capital and that there are low levels 
of lending by banking institutions. Not surprisingly, approximately 50 percent of small 
enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa have identified access to finance as a major obstacle to their 
business activities (see figure 13). 
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Figure 12. Investment financing methods of firms in SSA. 
 
Source: World Bank, 2013. 
 
Figure 13. Share of firms with access to finance as major constraint.  
 
Source: World Bank, 2013. 
In an effort to increase the level of participation of financial institutions to finance small 
medium enterprises public banks, such as the African Development Bank (AfDB), are driving a 
number of initiatives designed to encourage the participation of financial institutions. One 
notable initiative is the African Guarantee Fund (AGF), which is a for-profit social investment 
fund. The AGF is owned by AfDB, AECID and DANIDA with contributions of US$10 million, 
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US$20 million and US$20 million, respectively (African Development Bank, 2012). Over the next 
3 to 5 years, this share capital is expected to increase to US$500 million, giving the institution 
capacity to guarantee up to US$2 billion worth of SME loans. The additional capital will be 
coming from bilateral donors, private investors as well as from DFIs (African Development 
Bank, 2012). The AGF will select certain financial institutions to be partner institutions by 
assessing their commitment to grow their SME portfolio and improving financial product 
offerings to SMEs. For these partner institutions AGF will have two lines of activity: 
1) Partial credit guarantees: the provision of partial guarantees for financial institutions on the 
African continent to incentivize them to increase debt and equity investments into SMEs. 
These guarantees, with different fee structures (see table 3), will support: 
a) Loans made by client financial institutions to SMEs through a hybrid approach 
(portfolio and individual loan basis); 
b) Funds mobilization (i.e. issuance of bonds) by financial institutions in support of 
their SME financing activities; and 
c) Equity capital financing for SMEs.  
2) Capacity development: supporting AGFs partner institutions enhance their SME financing 
capabilities through assisting to improve the capacity to appraise and manage SME 
portfolios (African Development Bank, 2013). 
Table 3. Mechanisms of the AGF 
Guarantee type 
Guarantee 
Limit 
Pricing 
    
Originating Fee 
(flat) 
Guarantee Commissions 
(p.a.) 
Portfolio (Loan) guarantee  US$2,500,000 0.75% 2.00% 
Individual (Loan) Guarantee  US$500,000 0.75% 1.75% 
Equity Capital Guarantee  US$500,000 1.00% 5.00% 
Resource Mobilization 
Guarantee  
US$1,000,000 1.00% 2.50% 
Source: African Guarantee Fund, 2013. 
Operationally, the AGF will work on a risk-sharing basis with financial institutions and 
the maximum risk coverage ratio will be 50 percent. The balance of risk will be borne by the 
financial institutions (African Development Bank, 2013). AGF is designed to achieve a triple-A 
rating in order to attract a zero percent risk-weight on SME loans provided by partner 
institutions. This will allow these institutions to lend money with limited need to set aside 
regulatory capital because of the guarantee from the highly-rated AGF. The tenor of the 
guarantee will be for 80 percent of the life of the underlying transaction. The first of the AGF 
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guarantee agreements are expected to be signed imminently and thus an assessment of the 
guarantee is not possible at this point, however, it is reported that there is high interest from 
financial institutions on the African continent (African Development Bank, 2012). 
It is worth noting for the purposes of future research that over and above the general 
consensus that SMEs lack long-term finance at reasonable lending rates, working capital 
facilities are also starting to be emphasized. The AfDB notes that (African Development Bank, 
2012, p. 3): ‚SMEs … complain … how banks are hesitant to provide long-term lending and 
working capital facilities, both of which they need for growth.‛ Currently, 15 percent of small 
enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa use banks to finance working capital, however, only a small 
proportion (6 percent) of their working capital needs are covered by this type of finance (see 
figure 14). 
Figure 14. Financing of working capital by SSA firms.  
 
Source: World Bank, 2013. 
The need for working capital finance from financial institutions is echoed by Standard 
Bank, which found that there is a need for working capital facilities for SMEs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Botha, 2011). To this end, Standard Bank has launched a product called Quick Loans, 
which provides unsecured loans of between US$300 to US$30000 for 3 to 12 months, as well as 
other forms of finance to traders (Standard Bank, 2013). Standard Bank (2013) has established 
SME banking in 13 African Countries (excluding South Africa) and during 2011 provided 
financial services to more than 150,000 SMEs across these countries.  
In general data on the asset composition of banks across different regions shows that 
unlike banks in other regions of the world, African banks hold a much smaller share of their 
assets in private sector loans and a much larger share in government securities, foreign assets, 
and liquid assets (Beck et al., 2011, op cit). Household credit constitutes only a small share in 
bank credit, except in countries where financial sectors are more developed like South Africa.  
Banking sectors in most African countries are highly concentrated. In many countries, 
banks are predominantly foreign-owned, many of them being regional banks from other 
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African countries. Banks also operate very profitably, with subsidiaries of foreign banks in sub-
Saharan Africa having higher returns on assets than subsidiaries of the same banks in other 
regions (Honohan and Beck, 2007). 
It is not clear the extent to which the findings on the reverse link between financial depth 
and growth found in the context of developed and emerging economies is as relevant for low 
income countries, with a much lower level of financial development, and with large parts of the 
population and companies, lacking any access to financial services, as to countries with far 
deeper financial sectors. However, these findings will certainly be relevant for designing 
policies that will influence their future evolution. Furthermore, it may well be that in the near-
term, the issue is more related to avoiding excessive speed of growth of finance, that we have 
started to illustrate above, which may be more the threat to financial stability in the case of Sub-
Saharan Africa, (SSA). Indeed, as shown in figure 15, financial deepening in SSA has accelerated 
in recent years. The amount of private credit as share of GDP almost doubled from an average 
of 10 percent during the 1990s to 18 percent by 2010. Bank deposits as share of GDP grew from 
13 percent (in 1990-1999) to more than 20 percent (in 2010), while liquid liabilities (also known 
as broad money or M3)5 to GDP rose by more than 10 percentage points over the same period 
from 20 percent to exceed 30 percent.  
Figure 15. Financial deepening in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2010.  
 
Source: Global Financial Development Database, the World Bank, 2012. 
Note: Sub-Saharan Africa regional aggregate. This Figure was prepared by Florence Dafe. 
                                                             
5 They are the sum of currency and deposits in the central bank (M0), plus transferable deposits and electronic 
currency (M1), plus time and savings deposits, foreign currency transferable deposits, certificates of deposit, and 
securities repurchase agreements (M2), plus travellers checks, foreign currency time deposits, commercial paper, and 
shares of mutual funds or market funds held by residents. This definition of broad money is used by the IMF and the 
World Bank. 
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The above aggregate figures do not do justice to the fast pace of credit expansion in 
certain SSA economies. Table 4 provides country data about credit extension as share of GDP 
for all SSA economies individually. It highlights countries which have experienced a doubling 
of private credit to GDP within the past decade (2000-2010) in light gray. Economies where 
private credit tripled or increased up to tenfold over the same period are given in dark gray 
whereas SSA states that saw a rise in lending to the private sector of ten times or more are 
highlighted in black.  
Table 4. Credit Extension in Sub-Saharan Africa by Country, 1990, 2000, 2010. 
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This analysis shows that in the recent decade there has been a considerable number of SSA 
countries with very rapid credit growth, namely: 
 Benin and Swaziland where credit to GDP (almost) doubled; 
 Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania 
and Uganda where credit to GDP increased threefold and more (but less than 
tenfold); 
 Angola with private credit growing by a factor of more than 15-fold, or 1500 percent. 
Though this is a rough indicator, countries in the last two categories would seem more 
vulnerable to potential crises, so they may need to examine whether they need to introduce 
tighter regulations, in general, or in particular sectors. 
Financial systems in many African countries share features which seem to increase their 
vulnerability to shocks in the economic and financial system, including limited financial 
regulatory capacity, macroeconomic volatility linked to the economic structure of the countries 
(e.g. natural resource dependence, which implies volatility of their terms of trade) and political 
pressure for financial deepening with a view to develop the real economy.  
Fast credit growth might exacerbate vulnerabilities and enhance the risk of financial 
crises, as it has done in all other regions of the world. In the African context, the case of Nigeria 
provides a recent illustration that banking crises might cause a negative link between financial 
deepening and growth, even at relatively low levels of financial development. In 2004/2005 the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) mandated a steep increase of minimum bank capitalization with 
a view to create large internationally competitive banks and increase financial depth (Soludo, 
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2004). Banks achieved this capitalization, which was high even by international standards, by 
means of equity investment, mergers and acquisitions, resulting in the consolidation of the 
banking sector from 89 to 25 banks. The consolidation in the domestic banking sector, along 
with abundant capital in the wake of rising oil prices increased the speed of credit creation with 
significant flows to sectors with little growth impact. Between 2006 and 2009 private credit 
tripled from 12 percent to 36 percent of GDP. In real terms (2002 prices) this meant that 
domestic borrowing by the private sector grew almost fivefold (see figure 16).  
Figure 16. Nigerian private sector credit extension, 2003-2013. 
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, 2013 
This included loans used to finance share purchases, an undesirable practice clearly, 
setting the stage for a financial asset bubble particularly in bank stocks (Sanusi, 2010). The 
financial sector boom ended in a bust with a systemic banking crisis in 2009 as financial sector 
growth was excessive, partly because it had not been accompanied by the corresponding 
regulatory and supervisory upgrade. Consequently, non-performing loans as percentage of 
gross loans rose sharply from 9.5 percent in 2007 to almost 30 percent in 2009. Finally, nine 
financial institutions that were close to collapse had to be rescued at the cost of US$4 billion. 
The cost of cleaning up the balance sheets and recapitalizing the banks concerned is estimated 
at about 2.4 trillion Naira, equivalent to almost 8 percent of GDP (IMF, 2011). The Nigerian 
crisis shows there is no reason for complacency about the need for rigorous financial regulation 
in African economies especially in the face of rapid credit expansion in many SSA markets.  
  With respect to the effect of foreign bank presence on financial stability and growth in 
Africa, the existing evidence is somewhat ambiguous and requires further research. There are 
indications that foreign banks can bring in experience from other regional economies and can 
help exploit scale economies in small host countries. Yet the benefits for financial access remain 
ambiguous, partly because of the greater reliance of foreign banks on ‚hard‛ information about 
borrowers as opposed to soft information which often implies a focus on prime borrowers 
0 
1,000,000 
2,000,000 
3,000,000 
4,000,000 
5,000,000 
6,000,000 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
20
10
 
20
11
 
20
12
 
20
13
 
in
 M
ill
io
n
 o
f 
N
ai
ra
 
Private sector credit (real in 2002 prices) 
Working paper prepared for JICA/IPD Africa Task Force Meeting 
Yokohama, Japan, June 2-3, 2013 
23 
(Detragiache et al., 2008, Sengupta, 2007). Furthermore, it seems that foreign banks are 
fundamentally different from domestic banks. As argued by Rashid (2011) foreign banks seem 
less inclined to lending and their loans are likely to be more volatile than those offered by 
domestic banks. Despite strong foreign bank presence, the effects of the global financial crisis on 
African banks have been limited. In part, this is due to the relatively limited presence of banks 
from developed economies in Africa (with a high proportion of foreign banks being regional 
ones) and the fact that existing subsidiaries mostly fund themselves locally and not via their 
parents; this, however, limits the contribution these foreign banks make to national savings 
(Fuchs et al, 2011). In addition, reportedly large capital buffers—often above levels required by 
Basel III—have served to increase the resilience of African banks during the global financial 
crisis although this may have involved some costs for intermediation (Fuchs et al., 2012b). 
The fact that financial sectors in LICs tend to be relatively smaller and simpler provides 
an advantage in that governments have more policy space to influence the future nature and 
scale of their financial system. Furthermore, the fact the financial sector is smaller may imply it 
is less powerful politically; thus, potentially this gives more autonomy to regulators and—more 
broadly governments—to shape the financial sector.  
LICs thus have the advantage of being latecomers to financial development and can 
benefit from positive and negative lessons from experiences and research on other countries. On 
the other hand, the incompleteness of LIC financial systems means that important challenges 
remain on extending access (to all types of financial services) to those excluded, such as a high 
proportion of poor households, microenterprises and SMEs. More generally, it is difficult to 
fund working capital and investment in sectors such as agriculture and industry, especially for 
SMEs (and particularly at low spreads and longer maturities) crucial for growth and 
employment generation. The financing of infrastructure is a well-known problem in LICs, and 
the mobilization of sufficient long-term finance, as well as the most effective way to channel it 
to investment in that sector, is a key area of policy, where research, including clear 
understanding of market gaps—as well as effectiveness of policy interventions—could be very 
valuable.  
  Research on the desirable structure of the financial sector could include the following 
research themes and questions:  
a) What functions are particularly important to meet in African LICs? What are the 
deficiencies and needs in these areas in LICs? For example, how can sustainable lending 
at relatively low spreads and sufficient maturities to SME be best encouraged? What are 
the main challenges for delivering that type of finance in LICs? What are the specific 
needs of particular sectors, e.g. agriculture, for innovation? These and related issues 
could be researched using a number of methods, including consultation with 
policymakers and practitioners, theoretical analysis, empirical analysis, such as cross 
country and time studies, as well as in-depth case studies. Surveys of private companies 
to determine unmet demand for financial services, and especially credit at reasonable 
cost, and maturity would be valuable. 
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b) What combination of public/private institutions/mechanisms may be desirable to best 
achieve the three objectives of growth, financial stability and equity? This would look—
in general and in country settings—at the existence of market gaps and market failures 
in specific areas (e.g. long-term finance) in LICs, as well as potential government 
failures. Careful review of theoretical and empirical work needs to be combined with 
analysis of experiences to offer a balanced menu of policy options for most effective 
institutional arrangements in particular country contexts. What mechanisms (public 
guarantees, first losses assumed, for example by IFC) are desirable to encourage private 
financing? How can they be best structured to avoid excessive contingent public 
liabilities and for them to be effective? What experiences exist, which have worked well? 
How can they best be applied to LICs? 
c) Since the 2007/2008 crisis, increased interest has emerged in expanding the role of 
national and regional development banks to provide counter-cyclical lending when 
private credit falls. Also, public banks can be valuable for incorporating environmental 
externalities, to give LICs the opportunity to ‚leap frog‛ by adopting low-carbon 
technologies. More broadly, public development banks can be a valuable mechanism for 
financing particular strategies of development. What are the incentives and institutional 
arrangements that are required to make such development banks effective and efficient 
in LICs? What lessons can be learned from successful banks in developed countries (e.g. 
the European Investment Bank, German KfW) and emerging economies (e.g. BNDES in 
Brazil, as well as Asian development banks)? Most research on the experiences with 
development banks in Africa dates from the 1980s and 1990s and evaluations report 
fairly  negative experiences (Brownbridge et al., 1998). However, many development 
banks have been reformed over the past decade so that research implying re-evaluations 
of their effectiveness are necessary. Returning to the theoretical issues, what are the 
specific market gaps and failures which need addressing in specific LIC contexts, and 
how best can government failures be minimized? A hypothesis to be explored is that the 
effectiveness of development banks depends substantially on governance arrangements 
and political economy factors. Pressures on African governments to facilitate access to 
finance for the real economy may for example be particularly strong. What are pre-
conditions, including political economy ones for such banks to be effective in LICs, in 
ways similar to how they have been in emerging and developed economies? 
d) In the case of private banks, should a particular model, for example with respect to size, 
be encouraged? Many African countries banking systems have an oligopolistic structure 
where a small number of banks dominate the market and competition is limited. Is there 
a case that smaller more decentralized banks are better for reducing asymmetries of 
information? Are there more benefits from increased competition? Or are economies of 
scale an important factor for determining bank efficiency? Are potential costs of 
increased systemic risk of large banks so high that smaller, narrower banks may be 
preferable (Demigurc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010)? What are the lessons, if any, for 
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African LICs from the debate in developed countries on the structure of banking, for 
example as reflected in the recent UK Vickers report? What should be the preferred 
model for international banks in African LICs? Should LIC regulators encourage/require 
international banks to act as subsidiaries, rather than branches, as the UN Stiglitz Report 
proposes, to facilitate the task of national regulation? In India and some other 
developing countries, branching regulations are in place. What have been the 
experiences with such regulations? Should international (and possibly all large banks) 
be required to have not just branches in large cities, but also in smaller cities? 
e) To what extent is it best to concentrate in LICs on the development of banking, or should 
non-banking institutions (like stock markets and insurance markets) play also an 
increasingly important role? Both financial and human resources for developing and 
regulating non-bank institutions tend to be limited in African countries, so that efforts to 
develop such markets which are resource-demanding should be based on evidence-
based policy advice. Should specialized lending institutions, like leasing or factoring 
companies, as well as low-end financial institutions, such as cooperatives, credit unions 
and microfinance be promoted, as suggested in Beck, Demigurc-Kunt and Singer (2011)? 
If the insights of imperfect and asymmetric information are central, such information 
tends to be local and specialized (Stiglitz, 2012); this may provide an important 
theoretical and practical justification for greater use of more low-end and more 
decentralized institutions. Would the latter, for example be particularly effective for the 
financing of SMEs, and more broadly for the so-called missing middle? What is the 
empirical evidence on this, especially in LICs? For many African households such low-
end financial institutions constitute the only form of financial access. In Uganda, for 
instance only 21 percent of adults above the age of 15 have an account at a formal 
financial institution (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012). Governments have hence 
promoted cooperatives, credit unions and microfinance. However, there is little 
systematic research comparing costs and benefits of promoting such low-end 
institutions as opposed to access to banking services. How can a more desirable mix be 
encouraged? What is the empirical evidence on which to base such decisions? 
f) How can development of primary public debt markets be encouraged, to establish risk-
free benchmark curves? Based on deepening of public bond market, how can the local 
corporate bond market best be developed, including for long-term institutional investors 
to buy? What are relevant lessons from the analysis of experiences in other parts of the 
world and of recent empirical work on growth impact of structures of different financial 
sectors? 
g) What kind of institutional developments and financial innovations are valuable for 
promoting inclusive and more sustainable growth, without increasing systemic risk 
excessively? More specifically, what systems can improve access by the poor and by 
SMEs to sustained credit, without creating systemic risk for the financial system? Mobile 
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banking, which should be regulated proportionate to its risk, is an example for such an 
innovation. How can the poor not only have access to sufficient and sustainable credit, 
but be protected in times of crises, so that the poor are ‛not too small to be counted‛ 
during crises, whilst banks are rescued as considered too big to fail (BIS paper, 2012)? 
What are the complementarities between financial and other policies, e.g. for increasing 
productivity of SMEs? 
3.2 THE CHALLENGES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
A key lesson from recent crises has been the need for regulation to be both counter-
cyclical and comprehensive to avoid the build-up of systemic risk (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 
2009; Saurina and Repullo, 2011). Though there is agreement on these principles, there is far less 
consensus on how these should be implemented. A great deal of research and policy analysis is 
being carried out in the BIS, the IMF and the Financial Stability Board on these issues.  
One of the key problems is that LICs are not represented at all or are heavily 
underrepresented in these bodies. Therefore, there is insufficient focus in their work on how 
relevant these issues are for LICs and how they should be implemented in them. 
It may be useful to carry out research that would synthesize on-going discussions on 
these issues of counter-cyclicality and comprehensiveness, as well as other key issues that LIC 
regulators and policymakers define as a priority for them. Over the past decade, there has been 
rapid credit growth in a number of African countries including Angola, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, São Tomé and 
Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zambia (Iossifov and Khamis, 2009). Whether 
a manifestation of a credit boom or driven by fundamentals, rapid credit growth can give rise to 
systemic financial and macroeconomic risks, making the design and implementation of 
appropriate macro-prudential regulation and supervision a policy priority in Africa. For 
example, the Final Report of Making Finance Work for Africa, in collaboration with the 
Association of African Central banks (AACB) and Bank of Uganda (2011) defined as most 
relevant and urgent for African LICs—within Basel III—the incorporation of macro prudential 
supervision. Relevant research in this field would be therefore seen to be a priority. Similarly, 
the concept of proportionality in regulation implies that regulatory standards should be set in a 
way proportional to the importance of the risks. (GPFI/CGAP, 2011) and Basle Committee, 
2010). This requires further research for LICs. 
In the case of macro-prudential regulation, an important research issue is how can it be 
complementary to monetary policy in LICs? Macroeconomic volatility, for instance, remains a 
problem, partly because many African countries exports are concentrated in a few commodities, 
which makes their economies vulnerable to the large price shocks characteristic of commodities.  
Furthermore, practical issues on how best to implement macro-prudential policy would 
require research. These could include: 
a) What, in the LIC context, is the best choice of regulatory instruments through which 
counter-cyclical regulation can best be implemented both for solvency and liquidity? 
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What are the best indicators to determine in LICs when capital requirements or 
provisions need to be increased in boom times, or allowed to be drawn down in bad 
times? How should the variables and methodologies suggested internationally for 
counter-cyclical regulation be adapted to realities in LICs, as regards data limitations, as 
well as broader context of the smaller financial sector and existing financial regulation 
(Bank of Uganda, 2012)? 
b) Should counter-cyclical regulation of banks be done in LICs mainly at an aggregate level 
and/or in specific sectors, for example where lending is increasing fastest? How relevant 
is the emerging international experience in this field (Ren, 2011) for LICs? Should such 
measures be implemented through ex ante rules or have some flexibility? 
c) Focusing on the issue of comprehensiveness, how relevant are the international analyses 
of comprehensive regulation for African LICs and how any international conclusions 
should be modified for the LIC context? This requires taking into account the different 
nature of the financial system in LICs, where for example many financial transactions go 
through informal channels, or financial services are provided by non-banking 
institutions like retail shops or mobile service providers. The mobile payment service M-
Pesa, developed in Kenya, is a case in point. M-Pesa was launched to target mobile 
subscribers who were un-banked and now has over 7 million customers, both banked 
and un-banked. Light regulation in the testing phase of the financial product, on the 
principle of proportionate supervision, contributed to M-Pesa’s rapid growth. However, 
at a later stage of product development and at a higher level of outreach, regulation may 
need to become significantly more stringent for M-Pesa’s success to be sustainable. Yet 
comprehensive regulation of M-Pesa and other financial innovations may call for closer 
coordination between regulators of such institutions (e.g. telecommunications regulators 
in mobile banking) and banking regulators. Therefore, the challenge of comprehensive 
regulation has a very different institutional character in LICs. Does this mean that 
underlying principles should also be different, or is the criteria of avoiding systemic risk 
and concentration of risk common to any financial system?  
d) Also in relation to aims of financial regulation, in LICs these include more explicitly the 
purpose of inclusive growth. Can regulations go beyond stability and be designed more 
explicitly for growth? How can moral hazard best be avoided? Could lending support 
industrial policies, regional mandates, to ensure poor regions have more access to 
credit? What is the experience on establishing minimums and maximums of lending in 
certain categories, e.g. SMEs? Are experiences like the US Community Reinvestment Act 
or the Small Business Administration successful and relevant to LICs? Are their similar 
successful experiences in LICs? 
 Another issue highlighted by the Making Finance Work for Africa report, op cit as high 
priority are regional/cross-border issues. This refers not only to regulation of traditional 
international banks, but also to the rapidly emerging pan-African banks. As Fuchs, et al (2012b) 
point out, recent reforms of the international supervisory architecture concentrated on creating 
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colleges of supervisors for all internationally operating banks. Representation of African 
supervisors (especially LICs) is very limited; this is a source of concern as an international bank 
may have a small part of its portfolio in an African country, but implies a very large share of 
their market for a particular LIC country. The role of the LIC supervisor in these colleges 
becomes too small, if any at all, with potentially serious consequences for financial stability and 
growth impact in the LIC country. Research could be valuable, both on the institutional and 
technical aspects, but also on the political economy of how practically to enhance the ‚voice‛ of 
LIC supervisors in cross-border supervisory processes that have strong impacts on their 
economy, to overcome asymmetries of power that can lead to economically inefficient outcomes 
for LICs. 
 A key source of macro-economic volatility, as well as of financial systemic risk, is 
generated by certain types of capital flows. As a result, there has been growing recognition, in 
IMF and BIS, as well as in the academic literature (for example Stiglitz and Ocampo, 2008; 
Korinek, 2011; Gallagher, Griffith-Jones and Ocampo, 2012) on the need for management of the 
capital account. One of the newest research and policy challenges is how to most effectively 
combine regulation of capital flows and national counter-cyclical regulation. Again discussion 
in LICs has been more limited. Are capital account management measures needed also in LICs 
and under what circumstances? In best practice, when are capital account regulations more 
effective, and when are domestic prudential regulations, which focus on currency mismatches? 
How best can they complement each other? 
 The type of issues to be examined on capital account management for LICs would relate 
to issues of: a) timing, relating to how soon after a surge of capital flows starts occurring should 
measures to discourage more short- term flows be used? b) should they be temporary or part of 
a permanent system that can be suspended? c) if and when should these regulations be price or 
quantity based? d) How can avoidance be prevented? 
Our analysis above has focused more on discouraging excessive short-term capital flows 
when they threaten to cause macro-economic over-heating, overvalued exchange rates and 
increase financial sector systemic risk. However, there is also the important issue of attracting 
long-term capital flows, especially where it can provide technology transfer and access to new 
markets. This is a topic that now has new dimensions, such as the increased role of Chinese and 
other Southern investors. Research and research synthesis is needed on the positive impact and 
potential risks to the financial sector of these new country sources and modalities of investment. 
4. CONCLUSION 
While the 2007/8 crisis originated in, and strongly hit, developed economies, there is no 
reason for complacency in regulating African financial sectors. Fairly rapid credit growth in the 
late 2000s in the context of limited regulatory and supervisory capacity, especially in some 
countries, suggests that the time is now to draw appropriate lessons from the North Atlantic 
crises for African countries. There is also no reason to believe that if major private financial 
crises have hit all other continents, Africa would be an exception, unless it proceeds very 
Working paper prepared for JICA/IPD Africa Task Force Meeting 
Yokohama, Japan, June 2-3, 2013 
29 
cautiously with financial liberalization and financial development, as well as accompanies it 
with strong and effective regulation. Furthermore, the fact that African LIC systems are still 
relatively small in relation to the size of their economies allows more space for African 
policymakers and regulators to try to shape their financial systems so they serve well the needs 
of the real economy, by helping support inclusive and sustainable growth (for example by 
supporting much needed lending to SMEs), as well as desirable structural change. 
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